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Abstract Corporate venture capital (CVC) is a valuable strategic tool associated with numer-ous innovative outcomes. However, less is known about whether CVC investing cre-
ates value for the investing (or parent) firm. Drawing from the attention-based view 
and contingency theory, we suggest that an increase in firm value from CVC investing is contingent on attentional mechanisms that discipline the selection of new invest-
ment opportunities. We posit that increases in firm value associated with CVC invest-
ing accrues to firms adopting specific operational structures and operating in partic-
ular environmental contexts. We find support for our research model in a sample of 95 companies between 2000 and 2008.  
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Introduction 
Established firms often invest in external entrepreneurial ventures—termed corporate venture capital (CVC) investing—to gain awareness of and access to promising new resources and market opportunities (Ben-son & Ziedonis, 2009; Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2013). Research shows that 
numerous firm outcomes are associated with these investments, includ-ing improved innovative performance (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Wad-hwa, Phelps, & Kotha, 2016), strategic capability experimentation (Keil, Autio, & George, 2008), and greater awareness of technological changes (Maula et al.). The notable growth in scholarly research on CVC invest-ments may be partially attributed to the volume of venturing behaviors 
undertaken by firms each year—an estimated $5.5 billion were spent on CVC investments in 2014 in the United States, comprising approxi-mately 10.9% of all money spent in venture capital investments (Mon-eyTree Report, 2015).  Despite empirical convergence around the proposition that CVC in-
vestments can contribute to the investing, or parent, firm’s innovative pursuits, less is known about the conditions under which CVC invest-
ments enhance parent firm value. The literature offers two critical in-sights on this issue. First, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) found that the 
total dollar amount of CVC investments increased firm value when firms made CVC investments for strategic versus purely pecuniary gain. Sec-ond, Yang, Narayanan, and De Carolis (2014) found support for a U-shaped relationship between the level of CVC investment portfolio di-
versification and firm value creation. Both sets of findings point to the 
importance of “fit” between CVC investments and firm investment ori-
entation (i.e., strategic rather than financial goals, focused investment 
portfolios that emphasize options logic, or diversified portfolios that em-phasize net present value logic). Yet while CVC units reside within larger organizational contexts (Souitaris, Zerbinati, & Liu, 2012), and organiza-tions themselves reside within larger environmental contexts, it is un-
clear how these contexts influence a firm’s ability to derive value from 
their CVC investments. Scholars have long linked the efficacy of entre-preneurial strategies to organizational structure (e.g., Green, Covin, & Slevin, 2008; Rind, 1981), and environmental exigencies (e.g., Covin & Slevin, 1989), making the omission of these contingencies a notable gap in the venturing literature. 
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Broadly, we address the following research question: When are CVC 
investments associated with parent firm value creation? We explore 
two specific contingencies—one structural (internal to the firm) and 
the other environmental (external to the firm)—that create the condi-
tions that facilitate the relationship between CVC investment and firm value. Drawing from the attention-based view (ABV; Ocasio, 1997, 2011), we conceptualize CVC investing as a strategic focus of managerial atten-tion, pursued under the premise of “scanning the environment for novel 
technologies that either threaten or complement core businesses” (Du-shnitsky & Lenox, 2006, p. 756). While this focus prompts action, it does 
not necessarily translate to improvement in firm value. We therefore supplement ABV with contingency theory (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985), which has a tradition of linking the effectiveness of organizational ac-
tion to specific structural and environmental conditions (Van de Ven, 
Ganco, & Hinings, 2013). We posit that increasing firm value from CVC 
investing activity is contingent on the presence of two specific atten-tional factors, which we refer to as attentional coherence mechanisms. 
Specifically, we suggest that attention to CVC investing per se does not 
materially increase firm value. Instead, CVC investing in the presence of two attentional coherence mechanisms facilitates investing in those CVC 
investment opportunities with the greatest potential strategic benefit, 
and hence value creation, for the investing firm. 
In a 9-year panel of firms across 12 industries, we find an increase 
in value among those firms actively engaged in CVC investments with a concentrated operational structure and when operating in less munif-icent environments. Operational structure and environmental munif-icence are theoretically linked because they serve as bounds on man-
agerial attention—one due to the nature of a firm’s structure and the other due to the number of opportunities that may command manage-
rial focus. Moreover, we find that a specific gestalt of the three factors to-
gether—CVC investments among firms with a concentrated operational 
structure and when operating in less munificent environments— result 
in the most significant increase in firm value. This three-way interaction is valuable because “elements of strategy, structure and environment of-
ten coalesce or configure into a manageable number of common, predic-tively useful types that describe a large proportion of high-performing 
organizations” (Miller, 1986, pp. 235–236). Our study extends the CVC conversation in a number of important ways.  
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Our first contribution is providing new understanding regarding 
the boundary conditions on a firm’s ability to build firm value from its 
CVC investments. Prior research indicates that firm value creation is an appropriate focal-dependent variable for CVC research (Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006; Yang et al., 2014), particularly given that firm value cap-
tures investor’s current assessment, and more importantly their future 
expectation, of management’s ability to create value from strategic ac-tions (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000). In consideration of the bil-lions spent annually in CVC investments, whether investors perceive that 
such investments create firm value is a critical issue (Yang et al.). We add to this conversation by evaluating how elements of structure and envi-
ronment influence the CVC investment–firm value relationship. As noted by Narayanan, Yang, and Zahra (2009), the lack of theoreti-
cal grounding in the corporate venturing literature stymies researchers’ ability to build from prior work and to contribute to issues of broad in-terest to strategic management and entrepreneurship scholars. A second contribution of this research is therefore to integrate attention theory and contingency theory to the venturing literature. We use these theo-
ries to explain why two specific contextual factors—one endogenous to 
the firm and one exogenous—function as attentional coherence mech-anisms focusing managerial attention on those venturing opportunities 
of greatest potential strategic benefit, and hence create the situated at-tentional conditions for value creation from CVC investing. Finally, as explained by Ocasio (1997, p. 202), “[a]n attention based 
view of the firm implies that the ability of the firm to adapt successfully 
to a changing environment is conditional on whether the firm’s proce-dural and communication channels focus the attention of organizational 
decision makers on an appropriate set of issues and answers.” Yet, as dis-cussed by Ocasio (2011), scholars are just beginning to identify those attentional structures that translate behaviors into meaningful perfor-mance outcomes. We contribute to this conversation by supplementing the ABV literature with contingency theory, thereby providing a theoret-
ical rationale for why the CVC investment–firm value relationship mate-
rializes under specific conditions. The third contribution of this paper then is to the ABV literature directly, positing that the joint consideration 
of concentration within the firm’s operational structure and the firm’s task environment creates the conditions under which attention-driven behavior stimulates performance gains. 
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Theoretical Development 
The ABV, Contingency Theory, and CVC Investing 
We ground our research model in the ABV, which posits that firm be-havior is a function of what managers pay attention to and the con-
textual factors influencing attentional focus (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). The concept of attentional focus suggests that there is a limited number of issues managers focus on at any given time, and what managers focus 
on influences their actions (Simon, 1947). We posit that CVC invest-ing is one of many strategic decisions competing for the limited at-tention of senior decision makers. Firms undertake CVC investments typically for strategic versus pecuniary reasons (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006), such as exploring new market opportunities (Wadhwa et al., 2016). For example, CVC investing provides access to new technolo-
gies (Allen & Hevert, 2007), allows the investing firm to explore prom-ising but largely uncertain opportunities (Keil, Autio, et al., 2008), and 
facilities new inter-firm resource combinations while reducing strate-gic risk (Basu, Phelps, & Kotha, 2011). However, as one of a myriad of corporate strategic choices, there is little a priori reason to predict that CVC investing is in and of itself a 
meaningful driver of firm value. As noted by Hitt, Ireland, Camp, and Sexton (2001), value creation from entrepreneurial activity is partially 
a function of the activity aligning with a firm’s strategy—that is, whether the activity is strategically entrepreneurial. This point is particularly sa-lient when one considers the high-variance and experimental nature of CVC investing (e.g., Keil, Autio, et al., 2008). While engaging in CVC in-vestments implies managerial attention directed toward the activity, it does not imply that effectiveness necessarily follows; attention does not necessarily equate to success. This is consistent with contingency 
theory’s notion that there is no “one best way” absent consideration of context (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Thus, we must examine possible 
contingencies that promote fit between CVC investments and the larger 
organizational and environmental context, with fit defined here as the alignment of the strategic action with relevant contextual factors that accomplish managerial objectives. We therefore supplement ABV with contingency theory to theorize the structural and environmental con-
tingencies wherein CVC investments create firm value. 
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Contingency theory posits that “… performance outcomes of an or-
ganizational unit are a result of the fit between the unit’s external con-
text and internal arrangement” (Van de Ven et al., 2013, p. 394). Within the context of the ABV literature, contingency theory offers insight re-
garding how a particular decision fits within the broader organizational context and for predicting the performance implication of that decision (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). Under the rubric of attentional perspective (Oc-
asio, 2011), the firm’s institutional, economic, and social structures—
both within and outside of the firm’s boundaries—shape organizational 
attention, which in turn drives firm behavior. These exogenous and en-dogenous attention structures “regulate … the interests and identities 
that guide decision-makers’ actions and interpretation” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 195). This suggests that from the ABV and contingency perspectives, the context surrounding a decision is particularly salient to the outcome of that decision (Ocasio, 1997; Tosi & Slocum, 1984). We therefore focus 
on the attention structures conceptually likely to influence the value-cre-
ating potential of CVC investing—that is, to improve fit between strat-egy and context. 
The Contingent Effect of Operational Concentration The decision-making context frames managerial focus and attention (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), and selectivity of managerial attention in con-sideration of contextual exigencies contributes to the performance out-comes of a given strategic decision (Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003). To 
explore value creation for parent firms from CVC investments, we must therefore explicitly account for the contextual structural factors that fa-cilitate conditions under which decision makers are more likely to make a value-producing decision (Garg et al.). 
A firm’s internal structure produces important and changeable data that vie for the time and attention of senior management (Garg et al., 
2003). To that end, we focus on operational structure, defined as the 
extent to which a firm is more managerially concentrated or more dif-fuse in its business segment reporting structure. Firms with a concen-trated operational structure centralize strategic decision-making au-thority among as few executives as it deems necessary (Burns & Stalker, 
1961). Conversely, firms with a more diffuse operational structure 
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delegate certain strategic decision-making authority to lower level ex-
ecutives operationally accountable for a specific segment of the firm’s business (Chandler, 1991). Operational structure does not capture the 
firm’s specific organizational structure in terms of communication dif-
fusion (Burns & Stalker). Rather, operational structure reflects how the 
firm has organized its business segments in terms of decision-making authority and are delineable by the extent to which the senior most exec-utive is involved with the development of business unit strategy (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001). 
Senior executives in operationally concentrated firms are more likely to be involved in crafting business strategy below the corporate level (Chandler, 1991; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012), while operationally diffuse 
firms tend to have greater strategic decision-making decentralization 
(Donaldson, 1987). In operationally concentrated firms, senior exec-utives have greater awareness of the strategic challenges facing their lower level businesses, and are more apt to direct organizational re-sources to capture emerging opportunities (Eisenmann & Bower, 2000). This attentional focus is a critical factor in value creation from CVC in-vesting. The executive making the CVC investment decision is more 
aware of how such investments fit within the firm’s broader strategic focus, and as such, the investment is more likely to create material new 
value for the firm (Basu et al., 2011). We argue that operational structure is an attentional mechanism 
framing the interests and identities most salient to firm action (Oca-
sio, 1997). The more operationally concentrated the firm, the tighter the bounds on perceived opportunities, allowing decision makers to fo-
cus their attention on CVC activities that align with the firm’s strategic objectives; hence, the greater the likelihood that CVC activity yields im-
provement in the firm’s value. This broadly aligns with Hashai’s (2015) assertion that managers make more effective decisions when they focus their attention on fewer product categories, rather than split among mul-
tiple categories. A study by Laureiro-Martíınez, Brusoni, Canessa, and Zollo (2015) indicates that exploratory activities—which is how CVC in-vestments are typically conceptualized (Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005)—
may benefit from mechanisms that promote attentional control. Further, 
our argument is similar to Barnett’s (2008) premise that the more in-
ternally focused an organization’s attention structures, the more likely 
the organization will notice new opportunities congruent with the firm’s 
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current activities. The strategic purpose that focuses a firm’s entrepre-neurial initiatives relates to a strategically coherent portfolio of ventur-
ing activities that shares valuable linkages with the firm’s existing oper-
ations, thereby increasing firm value (Van Doorn, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2013). Hence: 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing operational concentration strengthens the 
relationship between CVC investments and parent firm value. 
The Contingent Effect of Environmental Munificence 
Attentional structures exist both inside and outside of the firm’s bound-aries (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). For example, Nadkarni and Barr (2008) ex-
plored the role of industry context on managerial attentional focus, find-
ing that firms in high-velocity industries focused greater attention on the 
competitive forces within the firm’s specific task environment than firms in stable industries. Similarly, Kabanoff and Brown (2008) found that 
varying degrees of environmental munificence and environmental dyna-
mism shifted managerial attention toward specific strategic typologies. 
We focus here on environmental munificence, which is the extent to 
which the firm’s task environment supports sustained growth with ad-equate resource availability (Dess & Beard, 1984). In contrast, less mu-
nificent environments are hostile, and firm growth largely comes at the 
expense of rivals’ market share and by aggressively entering new prod-uct-market domains (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Bausch, 2011). Low-
munificence environments heighten the need for careful deployment of organizational resources, as both the risk and the reward represented by a given option are elevated (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). While there is some debate in the literature (e.g., Sahaym, Steensma, & Barden, 
2010), operating in less munificent environments generally encourages 
entrepreneurial action (Covin & Slevin, 1989); a low-munificence envi-ronment corresponds to resource scarcity, which increases competitive pressure and spurs the entrepreneurial impetus (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Regarding CVC investments in particular, Basu et al. (2011) found that 
an industry’s competitive intensity related positively to the quantity of CVC partnerships formed. 
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Concurrent with the observation of Covin and Slevin (1989) that firms 
operating in less munificent environments perform better as a result of their strategic entrepreneurial actions, we posit a similar contingent ef-
fect of CVC investing on firm value among firms in similar operating en-vironments. Given the broad competitive impetus toward pursuing new 
entrepreneurial initiatives as munificence declines, we posit that less 
munificent environments frame managerial attention toward oppor-tunities that the market perceives as valuable (Park & Mezias, 2005). 
As munificence decreases, the options for new growth and profitabil-ity deteriorate with the constriction of surplus resources and the gen-eral decline in extant opportunities (Dess & Beard, 1984). Thus, intra-in-dustry competition increases (Keats& Hitt, 1988) and concomitant with the increase in competition is an increase in failure likelihood (Castro-giovanni, 1991). Hence, while the entrepreneurial impetus increases, so do the consequences for making a strategic mistake (Wiklund & Shep-herd, 2011). 
We posit that among firms actively engaged in CVC investments, low 
munificence creates a context of disciplined CVC investing, facilitating investment in those opportunities with the highest value-creation po-
tential. Firms in more munificent environments “may be able to stum-
ble along” without a clear attentional focus because environmental de-mands are modest and the consequences of a misstep are distal (Inkpen & Choudhury, 1995, p. 320). In resource-constrained environments, however, the context necessarily focuses managerial attention on those strategic investment opportunities that not only represent opportuni-
ties for new growth but also improve the firm’s competitive position-
ing vis-à-vis its rivals. Further, the low-munificence context may signal 
management’s long-term commitment to its CVC strategy (e.g., Park & 
Mezias, 2005). Operating in a low-munificence environment disciplines CVC investing activity toward those opportunities of the greatest poten-tial strategic value, and hence create a favorable condition to improve 
the firm’s broader value from its CVC investments. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Decreasing environmental munificence strengthens the relationship between CVC investments and parent 
firm value. 
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Attentional Coherence 
The preceding articulated the influence of a concentrated operational 
structure and low environmental munificence on the value-creating po-tential of CVC investments. Taken together, we suggest that these two factors act to jointly focus managerial attention— which we refer to as attentional coherence—on those CVC investments that represent stra-
tegic opportunities with the most probable benefit for the firm. In this section, we discuss why attentional coherence creates the conditions un-
der which CVC investments most increase firm value. We propose that the gestalt of CVC investment, operational concentration, and low envi-
ronmental munificence are most likely to contribute to a firm’s ability to create value from their CVC activities. 
Operational structure and environmental munificence function as at-tentional structures that jointly facilitate attention toward opportuni-
ties that fit within a firm’s overall strategic focus. Managers of operation-
ally concentrated firms focus on CVC investments most closely related 
to the firm’s core businesses. Further, when operationally concentrated 
firms operate in less munificent environments, managers are even more disciplined in their investing activity, spurred on by the impetus to seek new avenues for growth in a constrained market and to improve their competitive position (Covin & Slevin, 1989). As such, we expect opera-
tionally concentrated firms to create greater value from their external venturing strategies when they operate in resource-constrained (low-
munificence) environments. The lack of readily available resources and the consequences of a 
strategic mistake in low-munificence environments elevate the need for 
CVC investments to align with an organization’s core businesses to im-
prove firm value (Rawley, 2010). While firms in less munificent environ-ments may be more likely to make CVC investments in general (Basu et 
al., 2011), a concentrated operational structure in less munificent envi-ronments further focuses managerial attention to CVC activity in such a way as to direct attention toward pursuing those CVC investments most 
complementary to the firm’s existing operations. As poorly focused stra-
tegic actions can be detrimental to firms in low-munificence environ-ments (Inkpen& Choudhury, 1995), operational concentration works in conjunction to best focus attention on those investment opportunities 
with the strongest overall fit with the firm’s strategy. 
Ti t u s  &  A n d e r s o n  i n  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  Th e o ry  a n d  P r ac t i c e  4 2  ( 2 0 1 8 )       11
In short, an environment of dispersed attention with many growth opportunities (e.g., operationally dispersed and high levels of environ-
mental munificence) may yield a portfolio of dispersed CVC investments 
without clear strategic fit, while an environment of focused attention and limited growth opportunities (e.g., operationally concentrated and low 
levels of environmental munificence) encourages focused investments 
with tighter strategic fit. This joint, multiplicative effect between the 
firm’s structure and environment creates the conditions under which 
CVC investments are most likely to significantly improve firm value. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a three-way interaction effect between CVC investments, operational structure, and environmental 
munificence on parent firm value such that parent firm 
value increases most among firms with extensive CVC investments, that are operationally concentrated, and 
that operate in less munificent environments. 
Research Design 
Sample 
We used Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company Platinum and VentureXpert databases, along with the North American Fundamen-tals Annuals and Historical Segments databases from COMPUSTAT to 
construct a panel of U.S. publicly traded firms making CVC investments 
in three broadly defined industries: information and communication technologies, chemicals, and medical and laboratory equipment from 2000 to 2008.1 We restricted the sample to U.S. firms because CVC in-vestments may entail different motivations internationally (Winters & 
Murfin, 1988). We chose our focal industries because CVC activity is rel-atively common across industry participants and is consistent with com-parable studies on CVC investments (Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). Accounting for missing 
1. The three-digit SIC codes for these industries are—ICT: 357, 366, 367, and 737; chemicals: 281, 282, 283, 286, 287, and 289; medical and laboratory equipment: 384 and 382. 
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data on the focal variables, the final sample contained 406 firm-year ob-servations from 95 companies. Table 1 contains the summary statistics 
and correlation matrix for our final sample. 
Dependent Variable—Firm Value (Tobin’s Q) 
We measured firm value using Tobin’s Q, which is a ratio of the firm’s 
market value to the replacement cost of the firm’s assets, and it is a fre-
quently used proxy for firm value in the relevant literature (Li & Tallman, 
2011). A Tobin’s Q of 1.0 suggests that investors assess the company’s 
value to be equal to its assets; investors see no value added by the firm’s 
managers over and above that of the firm’s resources. A ratio below 1.0 indicates that investors view managers as enacting strategies that are 
below the replacement value of the firm’s underlying assets. A Tobin’s 
Q value above 1.0 suggests overvaluation such that investors view man-
agers as pursuing strategies that extract inordinate value from firm as-
sets; a higher Tobin’s Q indicates that investors view managers as mak-
ing profitable investments with firm resources (Brush et al., 2000). 
We chose Tobin’s Q over other performance metrics for three reasons. 
Tobin’s Q incorporates investors’ valuation of the firm’s future cash flows at time t, and is thus a forward-looking assessment of the firm’s growth prospects accounting for its strategic behaviors at t – 1, enhancing causal adjacency and minimizing serial correlation (Lang & Stulz, 1994). Build-
ing from the preceding, Tobin’s Q implicitly accounts for both pecuniary and strategic performance accruing from CVC investing, increasing the 
salience of our findings, particularly in publicly traded firms where mar-ket valuation is a critical performance metric (Bettis & Prahalad, 1983). 
Last, Tobin’s Q incorporates idiosyncratic strategic risk, facilitating com-
parisons across firms while being robust against accounting manipula-tions (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). 
We calculated Tobin’s Q following Chung and Pruitt (1994) as Q = 
(MVE +  PS + DEBT)/TA, where MVE is the firm’s market value; PS is the liquidating value of its preferred stock; DEBT is the sum of its short-term liabilities and book value of long-term debt, less short-term assets; and 
TA is the book value of the firm’s total assets. As with all our focal vari-ables, we assessed for skewness and kurtosis, and winsorized to the 
ninety-ninth and/or first percentile, as appropriate (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Ti t u s  &  A n d e r s o n  i n  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  Th e o ry  a n d  P r ac t i c e  4 2  ( 2 0 1 8 )       13
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 S
um
m
ar
y 
St
ati
sti
cs
 a
nd
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
 M
at
ri
x*
 
M
ea
n 
St
d.
 D
ev
. 
 M
in
  
M
ax
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10
  
11
1.
 F
ir
m
 v
al
ue
 
 3
.0
3 
 2
.6
0 
 
0.
36
  
20
.1
7
2.
 In
du
st
ry
 Q
  
2.
83
  
1.
16
  
0.
70
  
13
.9
0 
 
0.
32
3.
 E
nv
. d
yn
am
is
m
 
 0
.2
1 
 0
.1
1 
 
0.
02
  
0.
54
  
 –
 8
   
– 
0.
13
4.
 T
ot
al
 s
al
es
  
15
,0
05
.0
3 
 1
9,
89
3.
41
  
2.
69
  
10
,4
28
6 
 
 –
 0
.1
9 
  
– 
0.
10
  
0.
19
5.
 R
O
A
 
 0
.0
1 
 0
.3
0 
 
 –
 3
.8
5 
 
0.
31
  
0.
10
  
0.
05
  
0.
03
  
0.
15
6.
 S
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e 
 0
.2
2 
 0
.6
1 
 
 –
 0
.5
7 
 
5.
56
  
0.
30
  
0.
12
  
0.
04
  
 –
 0
.1
3 
 
0.
03
7.
 R
&
D
 in
te
ns
it
y 
 0
.1
7 
 0
.2
0 
 
0.
00
  
2.
00
  
0.
17
  
0.
06
  
0.
04
  
 –
 0
.2
8 
 
 –
 0
.1
7 
 
0.
17
8.
 D
eb
t/
eq
ui
ty
 r
ati
o 
 0
.2
7 
 
1.
09
  
 –
 8
.1
3 
 
7.
83
  
 –
 0
.1
2 
 
0.
02
  
0.
02
  
0.
05
  
0.
04
  
 –
 0
.0
3 
 
 –
 0
.2
6
9.
 F
in
an
ci
al
 s
la
ck
 
3,
40
0.
17
 
 6
,3
11
.2
4 
 
 –
3,
37
80
  
55
,5
97
  
0.
03
  
 –
 0
.0
2 
 
0.
24
  
0.
45
  
0.
16
  
 –
 0
.0
9 
 
 –
 0
.0
5 
 
 –
 0
.0
5
10
. C
V
C 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
 3
.7
1 
 
12
.0
0 
 
0.
00
  
18
9 
 
0.
08
  
0.
05
  
0.
03
  
0.
17
  
0.
08
  
 –
 0
.0
1 
 
 –
 0
.0
4 
  
– 
0.
02
 
 0
.2
2
11
. O
p.
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
  
0.
64
 
 0
.3
1 
 
0.
16
  
1.
00
  
0.
25
  
0.
05
  
 –
 0
.1
0 
 
 –
 0
.4
2 
 
 –
 0
.1
7 
 
0.
18
  
0.
34
   
– 
0.
10
  
 –
 0
.1
9 
 
 –
 0
.0
3
12
. E
nv
. m
un
ifi
ce
nc
e 
32
,0
85
.2
8 
19
,1
98
.8
9 
–3
,2
09
 
88
,9
12
 
–0
.0
4 
0.
20
 
0.
06
 
0.
13
 
0.
02
 
–0
.0
2 
0.
14
 
0.
02
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
0.
07
N
 =
 4
06
; N
um
be
r 
of
 fi
rm
s:
 9
5.
* 
N
on
in
du
st
ry
-a
dj
us
te
d,
 s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d,
 o
r 
tr
an
sf
or
m
ed
 m
ea
su
re
s.
 S
al
es
 in
 m
ill
io
ns
. C
or
re
la
ti
on
s 
60
.1
0 
an
d 
gr
ea
te
r 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 
a 
m
in
im
um
 p
<.
05
 le
ve
l.
Ti t u s  &  A n d e r s o n  i n  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  Th e o ry  a n d  P r ac t i c e  4 2  ( 2 0 1 8 )       14
Independent Variables 
CVC Investments
 We measured CVC investments as the count by firm year of all minor-
ity equity investments by established firms in new ventures. Count mea-sures have been used in CVC research (e.g., Keil, Maula, et al., 2008), as well as in similar literatures, such as acquisitions (e.g., Gamache, Mc-Namara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2014). As with all predictor variables, we standardized the measure to facilitate interpretation. In analysis not pre-sented here but available from the authors, we plotted the sample mean 
values of CVC investment activity and the sample mean value of Tobin’s 
Q and found that CVC investments only loosely track firm value. 
Operational Structure 
We measured operational structure using a modified Herfindahl index. Frequently used as a market-share metric, scholars increasingly use 
the index to measure within-firm concentrations of product portfolios 
or firm operations (e.g., Acar & Sankaran, 1999; Danzon, Nicholson, & Pereira, 2005; Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). Just as market share re-
flects the concentration of an industry, so too does business segment 
sales reflect the concentration of a firm’s operations. We measured op-erational structure using sales data for each business segment reported 
for each firm in each year of the study period. It is important to discuss operational structure in the continuum con-
text offered here and its relationship to a more classical diversification conceptualization (Robins & Wiersema, 2003). Before 1998, all pub-
licly traded firms were required to report each industry in which the 
firm generated 10% or greater of its gross revenue. Such data formed 
the basis of the entropy and concentric indices popular in diversifica-tion research (Robins & Wiersema). Following the implementation of 
rule SFAS N.131 by the U.S. SEC in 1997, however, firms were required to report each business segment from which the firm generated 10% or more of its gross revenue, or that which comprised 10% or more of the 
firm’s total assets.2 
2. Quoting directly from the rule text, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines 
a business segment as a within-firm operational entity that: “a) Engages in activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses (including revenues and expenses relating to transactions with other components of the same business); b) Whose operating results 
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Under the rule change, a firm could organize its business segments according to industry, to market, to geography, or some mixture thereof, and could restructure those business segments at any time and as it 
saw fit.3 Thus, under current accounting standards, it is not possible to 
delineate firm diversification along industry lines, as was historically 
the case. However, reported business segments reflect how the firm has 
structured its operations along the lines of independent profit and loss responsibilities and hence strategic control (Kumar, 2009). As such, we label the construct as operational structure, conceptualized along a con-tinuum ranging from operationally concentrated on the high end, to op-erationally diffuse on the low. 
To construct the variable for firm i at time t, we divided the amount 
of each reported business segment sales by the firm’s gross revenue and then squared and summed the resulting values (Acar & Sankaran, 
1999). Higher values indicate higher concentration of the firm’s opera-
tions, while lower values reflect a diffuse operational structure.4 
are regularly reviewed by the enterprise’s ‘chief operating decision maker’ to make decisions about resources to be allocated to the segment and assess its performance; and c) For which 
discrete financial information is available.” 3. For example, according to their 2008 10-K annual report, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. organized their business segments along functional, market, and geographic lines: U.S. Discount Stores, 
U.S. Superstores, U.S. Neighborhood Markets, U.S. Sam’s Clubs, and All International Units. In contrast, in 2003 Wal-Mart Stores had only three business segments all of which had the same industry participation as in 2008 but were operationally consolidated: Wal-Mart Stores 
(U.S. discount, supercenter, and neighborhood market stores), Sam’s Club, and International. 4. As a validity check for our operational structure operationalization, we constructed a ven-
ture-level Industry Overlap variable on the assumption that operationally concentrated firms would tend to focus their CVC investment activity in industries that closely relate to their core business. In a procedure similar to that of Yang et al. (2014), using keyword analysis, we matched the four-digit industry code for each CVC investment reported in the VentureXpert 
database to the SIC code of the investing firm. (Note that the industry code reported in Ven-tureXpert is a proprietary code from the database vendor, and does not necessarily follow the SIC convention, necessitating keyword analysis.) For each venture-investor pair appear-ing the data, we coded the variable as 4 if all four digits of the two industry codes matched, as 3 if three digits matched, and as 0 if two or fewer digits matched. We then averaged this 
value for each firm-year observation. We found a strong, positive correlation between our 
industry overlap variable and the firm’s operational structure (r = .23, p < .001), suggesting that consistent with our conceptualization, operational concentration functions as a disci-plining mechanism focusing CVC investment activity on opportunities closely related to par-
ent firm’s operations. 
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Environmental Munificence 
We measured environmental munificence as the 5-year average growth 
in net industry sales (Keats & Hitt, 1988). To calculate our munificence measure, we used year variables as predictors with net industry sales for each industry at the two-digit SIC level as the dependent variable in a regression analysis with the following form: yt = b0 + b1t + et, where y = industry sales, t = year, and e = the residual. Consistent with Bergh and Lawless (1998), we used 5 years of data for each regression (e.g., 2002–
2006 data predicted munificence in 2007). We used the regression slope 
coefficient to measure environmental munificence, which represents the average growth rate over the period with higher values indicating more 
munificent environments (Heeley, King, & Covin, 2006). 
Control Variables 
We employed nine control variables in our analysis. We first included 
environmental dynamism, or the extent to which the firm’s task environ-ment changes at an unpredictable rate, as environmental dynamism of-ten correlates with corporate entrepreneurial strategy (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009). We followed the procedure outlined by Keats and Hitt 
(1988) by averaging the standard errors of the slope coefficients from 
the equations used to calculate the environmental munificence variable. 
Higher standard errors reflect higher variance in industry returns and 
are therefore a proxy for uncertainty in industry profitability. As a fur-ther control for industry factors, following Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) and Yang et al. (2014), we calculated and included the mean level of To-
bin’s Q for each industry (industry Q) in the sample. We controlled for firm size using the firm’s log transformed gross revenue, and we included two performance controls—return on assets and sales growth rate—to better isolate the value creation effect of CVC investments (Tong & Li, 2011). We further controlled for other known 
elements of a firm’s entrepreneurial strategy at the corporate level—
research and development intensity (R&D/sales), firm leverage (debt/eq-uity ratio), and financial slack (current assets-current liabilities; Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wiklund, 2011). As Benson and Ziedonis (2009) 
noted, a firm’s innovation strategy may influence its use of CVC invest-ments as a strategic mechanism. 
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Analysis and Results 
Model Specification We express our research model using the following equation: 
  Firm Valueit  =  α + β1CVCit + β2OSit + β3EMit + β4CVC × OSit                                + β5 CVC × EMit + β6OS × EMit + β7CVC × OS × EMit  
+ ΛXit + δi + γt + εit                                                                   (1) 
In equation (1), we predict firm value for firm i at time t in a time-series 
cross-sectional model where CVC = CVC investments, OS = operational 
structure, and EM =  environmental munificence. Please note that equa-tion (1) also includes all possible lower order interactions to test our three-way interaction model (see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
In equation (1), X is a vector of our control variables with coefficient es-
timates Λ, δ is a firm-level fixed effect, γ is a year fixed effect, and ε is the residual term. 
A significant Hausman test statistic suggested that a fixed effect spec-
ification was preferred over a random effect specification to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010). Employing a firm-level 
fixed effect effectively accounts for omitted firm-level variables that may 
confound the relationship between CVC investing and firm value (An-
tonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). The firm-level fixed ef-
fect would also account for idiosyncratic responses to industry-specific shocks, rendering industry adjustment of the focal variables unneces-
sary. We further included a year fixed effect to control for unobserved 
variance in firm value as a function of time (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008), and to control for contemporaneous correlation (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). We report all results using clustered stan-dard errors and estimated all models using Stata 13.1 (StataCorp., 2013). 
Hypotheses Tests We present our hypothesis test results in Table 2, following Cohen et al. (2003) to build equation (1) cumulatively. Model 1 includes just the control variables, Model 2 presents the main effect of CVC investments 
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on firm value, Model 3 tests our two hypothesized two-way interac-tions with the three-way interaction absent, and Model 4 tests the full 
research model specified in equation (1). We report the log likelihood value to show improvement (decreasing log likelihood value) in model 
fit as we progress across the models. As expected, we found no support for the main effect of CVC invest-
ments on parent firm value (β = 0.046, p > .1; all test statistics two tailed) in Model 2. Also as expected, we found support for our two, two-way 
contingency effects on the CVC investments– parent firm value relation-
ship. The positive coefficient for the interaction between CVC invest-ments and operational structure suggests that as hypothesized, parent 
firm value increases when operationally concentrated firms make CVC 
investments (β = 0.337, p < .01). Plotting this relationship in Figure 1 
Table 2. Time-Series Cross-Sectional Model Results (DV: Firm Value)†
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4
	 β  S.E.  β  S.E.  β  S.E.  β  S.E.
Industry Q  0.400  (0.262)  0.248  (0.167)  0.230  (0.166)  0.225  (0.154)
Env. dynamism   – 0.252  (0.234)   – 0.496  (0.284)   – 0.572*  (0.273)   – 0.456  (0.261)
Total sales   – 4.332***  (1.200)   – 4.383***  (1.081)   – 4.202***  (1.115)   – 4.368***  (1.090)
Return on equity  1.871  (1.425)   – 1.105  (1.555)   – 1.174  (1.555)   – 1.029  (1.474)
Sales growth rate  0.769  (0.541)  0.853  (0.542)  0.802  (0.539)  0.816  (0.512)
R&D intensity   – 15.789***  (4.523)   – 19.445***  (4.657)   – 19.655***  (4.759)   – 18.977***  (4.856)
Debt/equity ratio  0.152  (0.289)   – 0.043  (0.323)   – 0.066  (0.347)   – 0.050  (0.350)
Financial slack   – 0.058  (0.067)   – 0.080  (0.059)   – 0.079  (0.059)   – 0.079  (0.064)
CVC investments    0.037  (0.080)  0.100  (0.066)  0.071  (0.045)
Op. structure    0.262  (0.258)  0.139  (0.248)  0.131  (0.248)
Env. munificence     – 0.824**  (0.312)   – 0.598*  (0.298)   – 0.986*  (0.378)
CVC 3 OS      0.339**  (0.101)  0.200*  (0.084)
CVC 3 EM       – 0.342*  (0.170)   – 0.500**  (0.153)
OS 3 EM         – 0.602**  (0.208)
CVC 3 OS 3 EM         – 0.292*  (0.129)
Constant  5.148***  (1.321)  5.734***  (0.970)  5.741***  (0.989)  5.747***  (0.960)
Firm fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Year fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
R2 (Within)  0.443   0.504   0.535   0.566
R2 (Between)  0.026   0.024   0.024   0.018
R2 (Overall)  0.087   0.081   0.090   0.075
F(Model)  14.89***   10.42***   13.64***   10.35***
* p<.05 ; ** p<.01 ; *** p<.001
N = 406; number of firms: 95
† Year dummies omitted for parsimony. Standard errors beside coefficients in parentheses. CVC = corporate venture
capital; OD = operational structure; EM = environmental munificence
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with a range of values between ±1 standard deviation (SD) of CVC in-vestments and operational structure (see Cohen et al., 2003) and includ-
ing a 95% confidence interval (CI) band shows a distinct improvement 
in firm value for active CVC investing and operational concentration. We evaluated the interaction further by estimating the average marginal ef-
fect of CVC investing on firm value across a range of operational struc-ture values in Figure 2 (see Williams, 2012), again including a 95% CI band. Figure 2 corroborates our initial support for hypothesis 1, with 
the range of a significant interaction effect falling in any area where the CI band does not contain zero. We found initial support for hypothesis 2, although further investiga-tion suggests a more nuanced relationship among CVC investing, envi-
ronmental munificence, and parent firm value. In Model 3, the focal in-
teraction term was negative and significant, as expected (β =  – 0.372, p < .05). However, plotting the interaction effect and calculating  the av-erage marginal effect, shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively, suggest a 
weaker positive effect on parent firm value from CVC investments made 
by firms operating in less munificent environments. However, we did 
Figure 1. Interaction of CVC Investments and Operational Concentration on Firm Value (With 95% CI)  
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Figure 2. Average Marginal Effect of CVC Investments on Firm Value Across Level of Operational Concentration (With 95% CI)  
Figure 3. Interaction of CVC Investments and Environmental Munificence on Firm Value (With 95% CI)  
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observe a significant weakening in firm value when firms made CVC in-
vestments in munificent environments—a finding we will address in greater detail in the discussion section. 
Last, we find support for the three-way interaction proposed in hy-
pothesis 3 (β =  – 0.285, p < .05). Because of the complexity interpreting 
three-way interactions from the coefficient estimates alone, we plotted the results in Figure 5 showing the relationship between CVC investment 
and firm value at different combinations of 61 SD of CVC investments, 
operational structure, and environmental munificence. As hypothesized, 
we observed an increase in parent firm value among firms making CVC investments, that are operationally concentrated, and that operate in less 
munificent environments. The CVC investment–parent firm value rela-tionship is thus particularly contingent on the presence of mechanisms focusing managerial attention on strategically valuable investments. Fur-
ther, and as reported in Table 3, we find substantial support for our pre-ceding interpretation from simple slope comparisons testing for signif-
icant differences across all possible configurations. 
Figure 4. Average Marginal Effect of CVC Investments on Firm Value Across Level of 
Environmental Munificence (With 95% CI)  
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Robustness Analysis Given that we selected the sample industries based on an a priori ex-
pectation that constituent firms were more likely to make CVC invest-
ments, there is the possibility that  sample selection bias may be artifi-
cially inflating the parameter estimates of our focal research model. The 
censoring of firms in the sample based on their actual engagement in 
Figure 5. The Joint Influence of CVC Investments, Operational Structure, and Environ-
mental Munificence on Firm Value    
Table 3. Configurational Model Simple Slope Comparisons†
Pair comparisons  β  S.E.  z – p Value  95% CI
2 vs. 1   –0.416  (0.320)   –1.30 – 0.194   –1.042 – 0.211
3 vs. 1  0.984  (0.237)  4.15 – 0.000  0.519 – 1.448
4 vs. 1   –0.601  (0.365)   –1.65 – 0.100   –1.317 – 0.115
3 vs. 2  1.399  (0.334)  4.19 – 0.000  0.745 – 2.053
4 vs. 2   –0.185  (0.366)   –0.51 – 0.612   –0.903 – 0.532
4 vs. 3   –1.584  (0.467)   –3.39 – 0.001   –2.501 –  –0.668
† 1: Op. Diffuse/Low Env. Munificence; 2: Op. Diffuse/High Env. Munificence; 3: Op. Concentrated/Low Env. 
Munificence; 4: Op. Concentrated/High Env. Munificence.
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CVC activity exacerbates this possibility. To address this concern, we fol-lowed the Heckman (1979) selection methodology and constructed an inverse Mills ratio selecting on the basis whether Firmi in Yeart made a 
CVC investment for all publicly traded firms within our sampled indus-tries, with total employees, total cash, total assets, and net income as ex-clusion restrictions. Estimating each focal model while including the in-verse Mills ratio and correcting the standard errors revealed no material 
change in the sign or significance of our reported results. We next employed a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure to evaluate whether CVC investments correlated with the equation distur-
bance term. Our fixed effect specification should largely address con-
cerns over unobserved variance influencing model results (see Anton-akis et al., 2010). However, there is a possibility of endogeneity arising from other sources that pose a concern, including simultaneity between 
Tobin’s Q and CVC investments. Importantly, if we can empirically rule-out endogeneity within the direct effect, there is no necessity—partic-ularly given the potential for a spurious Type II error (see Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014)—to estimate a 2SLS model with instruments for the interaction terms. We used as instruments for CVC investments 
the firm’s capital intensity (property, plant, and equipment/sales) and the count of equity joint ventures made in the focal year. We expect capital intensity to negatively covary with CVC investments, because 
capital-intensive firms may be less likely to incur the additional cost of active CVC investments (Balasubramanian & Lieberman, 2010). We se-
lected equity joint ventures on the basis that firms that make frequent CVC investments may also employ equity joint ventures (van de Vrande et al., 2009). 
In the first-stage equation, our instruments were individually (β =  – 0.697, p < .05 and β =  0.378, p < .001, respectively) and jointly signifi-cant (F = 4.86, p < .001) predictors of the presumed endogenous vari-
able (evidenced by a significant p value for the individual coefficients 
a significant F statistic for the model; see Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). 
In the second stage equation, we observed nonsignificant test statistics for both the Sargan–Hansen test (ρ = 1.211; p = 0.271) and the David-son–MacKinnon test (ρ = 0.606; p = .437). A failure to reject the null for the Sargan–Hansen test indicates that we properly excluded the instru-ments, suggesting that there is no material correlation between the fo-cal endogenous variable and the equation disturbance term. A failure to reject the null for the Davidson–MacKinnon test indicates, however, that 
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a noninstrumental variable estimator is preferred—the focal variable is not likely endogenous (for a discussion, see Wooldridge, 2010). In con-junction with the inverse-Mills ratio, we thus found little compelling evi-dence that endogeneity is a meaningful concern for our research model. 
We conducted several additional analyses to probe the efficacy of our 
reported results. We first estimated a fixed-effect ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model to calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs); VIF values were below the recommended 10.0 cutoff (model VIF < 2.6; see Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998), mitigating concerns over nonessen-tial multicollinearity. We then estimated our models absent the control variables to evaluate the possibility of a Type I error due to spurious-ness and again observed no material difference from our reported re-
sults in terms of sign and significance. We further probed for outliers with standardized residuals greater than 63 SD. Estimating our models absent these observations again revealed no material change to our re-ported results. We further tested for a 1-year lag in the main effect re-lationship, and the corresponding interaction effects. Similar to Dush-
nitsky and Lenox (2006), we observed no significant relationship in the lagged models, suggesting a contemporaneous relationship between 
CVC investments and firm value in the presence of equally contempora-neous attentional structures. 
Discussion We make equity investments in companies around the world to further our strategic objectives and to support our key busi-ness initiatives, including investments through our Intel Capi-tal program. We generally focus on investing in companies and initiatives to stimulate growth in the digital economy, create new business opportunities for Intel, and expand global mar-kets for our products (Intel Corp., 2007, p. 26). We make investments in privately held companies that develop technology or provide services that are complementary to our products or provide strategic value (Cisco Systems, Inc., 2007, p. 6). 
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The preceding excerpts from the annual reports for Intel and Cisco illus-trate two companies that made aggressive CVC investments, were op-
erationally concentrated, operated in low-munificence environments, 
and have high Tobin’s Q. For these firms, making CVC investments is not solely a pecuniary mechanism, but rather a purposeful strategic behavior 
that enhances value when the firm’s structure and environmental con-
ditions facilitate managerial attention in a specific and strategic man-ner (Ireland et al., 2009). Our research model supports the preceding 
anecdotal observations—increasing parent firm value depends on the 
alignment of strategy, structure, and the environment. Such a finding car-ries important implications for strategy and entrepreneurship scholars. 
Theoretical Implications As is frequently noted in the venturing literature, there is a clouded pic-
ture of the main effect of CVC investments on corporate financial and market performance. For example, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) exam-
ined the influence of annual CVC investment on Tobin’s Q, and found that 
firms making CVC investments tend to have higher values of Tobin’s Q 
than noninvesting industry peers; further, the more money firms invest 
in CVC opportunities, the greater the parent firm’s value when the invest-ments are driven by strategic objectives. Conversely, Yang et al. (2014) 
found an insignificant relationship between a firm’s level of CVC invest-
ing activity as measured by the size of the firm’s CVC portfolio and To-
bin’s Q. Variance in operationalization and research design may explain 
some of the contradictory findings. However, another explanation may simply be that there is little theoretical rationale to expect that ventur-ing behaviors per se improve value. 
As Ocasio (1997) noted, factors within and outside of the firm frame the range of issues that managers pay attention to at any given time. These factors interact to form gestalts that further direct managerial at-
tention toward more specific information (Barnett, 2008). Decisions in-
fluenced by these gestalts require a catalyst—an issue or problem facing the manager. In our model, the catalyst is the decision to pursue a CVC investment opportunity. There is, as has been noted (e.g., Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009), no shortage of potential CVC investments, and firms may choose to make such investments on the basis of pecuniary reasons, 
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strategic reasons, or some combination thereof. The question, then, is whether the attentional gestalt surrounding the decision encourages a strategic focus in venture investing or detracts from it.  
Our findings indicate that while operational structure and environ-
mental munificence jointly influence the CVC investment–parent firm value relationship, increases in valuation materialize only among opera-
tionally concentrated firms, with environmental munificence then mod-
erating this relationship. In effect, firms pursuing CVC investments real-
ize material positive valuation gains only when the firm is operationally 
concentrated and when the firm operates in a less munificent environ-
ment. That is, the CVC investment–parent firm value relationship is con-tingent upon an attentional gestalt focusing managerial attention toward 
opportunities with strong fit with the organization’s strategic focus. The 
preceding supports Ocasio’s (1997, p. 196) observation that the interac-tion of attention structures “provide the decision-makers with a struc-tured set of interests and identities . . . [which] generate in turn a set of 
decision premises and motivations for action.” In short, CVC investments are one of many possible entrepreneurial investment opportunities, but their ability to drive value depends on the coherence of attentional struc-tures focusing managerial attention toward the most strategically rele-vant and value-enhancing CVC opportunities. We may infer the importance of the preceding contingent effect from 
our comparison of the different configurational model slopes reported in Table 3. Table 3 shows whether the slopes representing the four pos-
sible configurations statistically differ from each other. A significant in-
teraction effect coefficient indicates at least one possible slope differs from zero; making the comparison in Table 3 show whether the focal 
configuration— CVC investment activity, high operational concentration, 
and low environmental munificence (configuration #3)—significantly 
differs from the other possible configurations. Supporting the graphical 
depiction in Figure 5, we find that our hypothesized configuration was 
the only configuration that differed from all other possibilities. We may interpret this analysis as evidence for the joint contingent effect of at-tentional coherence. From an attentional theory perspective, it may not simply be the presence of an attentional coherence mechanism but a combination of mechanisms that are necessary to observe performance outcomes from engaging in a given strategic action. It is notable, however, that our analysis also revealed a slight decrease 
in firm value when operationally concentrated, CVC investing firms 
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operate in munificent environments. As shown in Figure 3, we found 
that operationally concentrated firms operating in low-munificence en-vironments generally made more CVC investments per year than those 
operationally concentrated firms operating in more munificent envi-
ronments. We propose two possible reasons for this finding, although we caution that this area necessitates additional research to draw sub-stantive conclusions. We conjecture that when operationally concen-
trated firms operate in more munificent environments, managers may be less willing to incur additional risk via aggressive CVC investing be-cause the opportunity cost is not as salient (Dess & Beard, 1984). This 
is because the various benefits ascribed to CVC investing—e.g., innova-
tive and learning-related outcomes—are less critical in munificent en-vironments (Sirmon et al., 2007). Another possibility is that managers may act imprudently in munif-icent environments by, for example, overpaying for an acquisition tar-get (Wan & Yiu, 2009). Given the observed negative trend between CVC 
investments and firm value in munificent environments, concentrated 
firms in munificent environments may make fewer but “bigger”—and 
hence riskier—bets in their CVC investments. For example, a firm may invest a large sum of money in one venture rather than make several smaller investments in multiple ventures. In short, absent the disciplin-
ing mechanism that environmental munificence provides, higher vari-
ance CVC investments may be equally likely to destroy firm value as to create it. 
Thinking broadly about the implication on CVC research, our find-ings add to the growing recognition that undertaking CVC investments should be driven by strategic objectives, but that even still, absent a spe-
cific combination of elements, CVC investing is unlikely to produce prox-
imal, tangible economic outcomes from the investing firm. While ad-ditional contingency hypotheses may shed additional insight into the 
boundary conditions of CVC investment benefits, it is also possible that scholars have overlooked critical intervening mechanisms—mediators—that may be necessary to translate CVC investment activity into pecuni-
ary benefits. 
One such mediator may be absorptive capacity—a firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment (Co-hen & Levinthal, 1990, p. 589). Research indicates that absorptive capac-ity drives CVC investing (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b), and subsequent 
learning from CVC investing is a direct, tangible benefit from making 
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these investments (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). In the context of our model, we may combine absorptive capacity with operational concen-tration, for example, in a conditional indirect effect model. That learn-ing results from CVC investing is rather straightforward, but learning in the presence of operational concentration may demonstrably acceler-ate, or amplify, this learning. For example, an operationally concentrated 
firm may be better able to assimilate and exploit relevant knowledge gleaned from CVC investment activity because of the greater focus, and hence depth of knowledge, on fewer strategic activities. An analogous argument may be made for environmental hostility as an additional contextual effect. In this way, absorptive capacity becomes 
the proximal outcome from CVC investment activity, firm value the dis-tal outcome, but the nature of this indirect effect changes as a function 
of the firm’s operational concentration and its environmental munifi-cence. Testing the preceding possibility necessitates a new study, but 
our finding of a contingent relationship between CVC investments and 
firm value we hope prompts new inquiry into the specific causal mech-anisms, in conjunction with contingent effects, through which the stra-
tegic benefits resulting from CVC investments contribute to the invest-
ing firm’s financial position. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions While our analysis is a conservative approach given the data available, our research design precludes the ability to draw a direct causal infer-
ence between CVC investments and firm value. One of the difficulties in this type of analysis is that a multitude of factors— some within the con-
trol of the firm and some exogenous to it—contribute to the valuation of 
publicly traded firms, and controlling for all possible confounds is both empirically and practically impossible. As such, readers should interpret our results through the lens of adding additional evidence to the ventur-ing conversation regarding the theoretical and empirical support for the 
a priori notion that CVC investments independently drive performance. Another limitation of our study is that we do not directly measure at-tentional focus. Our theoretical model is predicated on the notion that 
operational concentration and environmental munificence are atten-
tional structures that influence the attentional focus of decision makers, 
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and as such, CVC investments within the specified operational structures 
will be associated with firm value. However, we do not directly measure attentional focus, and this represents a promising opportunity for future research. We think one option may be the employment of policy capture and conjoint studies, where the researcher can isolate and manipulate managerial focus. Additionally, given the presence of observed contin-
gency factors influencing the CVC investments–parent firm value rela-tionship, we would certainly expect other such moderators within the broader nomological network, and such analyses represent fruitful ex-tensions of our model. Finally, future research could explore the possi-bility that different attentional structures may direct managerial atten-
tion to different forms of activities, or may influence the efficacy of those 
activities differently. For example, operationally diffuse firms may have greater success with international expansion activities than operation-
ally concentrated firms, suggesting that operational diffusion is a better 
fit for certain contexts than operational concentration. 
Conclusion 
Venturing is a common firm behavior, though the benefit of venturing is a question without a simple answer. Our study suggests that making CVC 
investments, absent contingency considerations of fit within the context of structure and environment, are unlikely to manifest in satisfactory 
improvement to firm value. Thus, critical to adopting a CVC investment strategy is an understanding of the endogenous and exogenous contin-gencies that better focus managerial attention on those CVC investment 
opportunities having the greatest potential strategic benefit for the firm. It is our hope that this study furthers the conversation on the strategic basis for corporate venturing, and in doing so, spurs the investigation of new boundary conditions on the CVC investment–value relationship. 
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